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A B S T R A C T
It was wrong to assume that only a ‘new regulatory model for the 21st century’ could lead to a more
efﬁcient electric distribution grid. In the roll-out of REV, the U.S. regulatory model again showed its
inherent and inevitable effectiveness: soliciting advice from a broad range of parties that will satisfy
public opinion, economic efﬁciency, and the capital markets in the provision of electricity distribution
markets and services.
ã 2016 The Author. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Responding to some of the highest power costs in the United
States, since 2014 New York has pursued an ambitious initiative
called “Reforming the Energy Vision” (REV) to transform the way
electricity is distributed and used in New York State.1 Borrowing
often from an initiative in the UK called “RIIO” (Revenue =
Incentives + Innovation + Outputs), the state has invoked a futur-
istic vision where traditional electricity distributors become
“distributed system platform providers” (DSPPs) that take advan-
tage of modern “multi-sided markets” and overcome “information
asymmetry” and “capex bias.” Under the New York Public Service
Commission (NYPSC’s) REV vision, traditional utilities promote
self-generation and third-party “micro-grids” with business
interests aligned with achieving consumer value—to “forever
change the way consumers buy and use energy” by fostering an
electric system that is “nimble, distributed and consumer focused.2
For the past two years the level of activity in New York regarding
REV has been intense. Over 180 organizations (utilities, power
providers, non-proﬁts, government agencies, trade associations,
and others) have ﬁled 972 documents regarding the initiative. The
initiative started out describing the end to the “utility regulatory
model of the previous century3 and replacing it with:E-mail address: jeff.makholm@nera.com (J.D. Makholm).
1 “Regulatory Breakthrough? New York Ponders UK Approach to REV, Breaking
Energy, http://breakingenergy.com/2014/12/05/regulatory-breakthrough-new-
york-ponders-uk-approach-to-rev/
2 Case 14-M-0101, May 19, 2016, p. 22.
3 Order Adopting a Ratemaking and Utility Revenue Model Policy Framework, May
19, 2106, p. 1.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2016.10.005
1040-6190/ã 2016 The Author. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access articleAn intelligent network platform that will provide safe, reliable
and efﬁcient electric services . . . that monetizes system and
social values, by enabling active customers and third party
engagement that is aligned with the wholesale market and bulk
power system.
Much has been written in the U.S. energy trade press regarding
REV, including in The Electricity Journal and Public Utilities
Fortnightly.4 For the most part, however, despite its headline-
grabbing inauguration as a whole new regulatory model, the
initiative settled down to a familiar process central to that previous
century’s regulatory model. That is, despite its continued fascina-
tion with UK regulatory mechanisms, the PSC’s direction to its
jurisdictional utilities conforms to the traditional direction for the
electric distribution utilities in New York to take up various issues
(rate design, customer engagement, data sharing, and reliability) as
part of their next rate ﬁlings according to age-old administrative
procedures. What happened to the “fundamental shift in utility
regulation”?5
Part of REV’s initial discussion about the problems with
traditional U.S. utility regulation was probably somewhat too
narrow of a perspective. The U.S. regulatory model deals with more
than electricity distribution. In other areas, the U.S. model has4 Andrew O. Kaplan, “REV’ed and Ready,” Public Utilities Fortnightly, Volume 28,
Issue 4, May 2015, http://www.pierceatwood.com/webﬁles/Kaplan%20article_PUC
%20Fortnightly_May%202015_web.pdf Fereidoon P. Sioshansi, “Electricity Currents-
New York State Embarks on Bold New Vision,” The Electricity Journal, Volume 27,
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lated, and green energy markets. The way that FERC has grafted
innovative “Coasian” markets in property rights onto America’s
traditionally regulated interstate gas pipeline network “platform”
is perhaps the best example.6 The U.S. interstate gas supply and
transport business now essentially regulates itself (with tiny
administrative and transaction costs compared to those in
Europe) and has effectively displaced much U.S. coal-based
power generation with more carbon-friendly natural gas. None of
those advances in gas markets have spread to Europe—where gas
prices are more than double what they are in North America and
which is now importing record quantities of U.S. steam coal for
power generation. Nobody credibly claims that there is tension
between the most advanced technological markets for gas and the
fact that every mile of every U.S. interstate pipeline conforms to
traditional U.S. regulation of interstate pipeline revenues and
prices.
Another part of REV’s rollout was its seeming adoption of
some new UK regulatory initiatives that are inconsistent with a
century of the institutions that shaped U.S. regulation. The
principles and institutions for dealing with the provision of
public services by private enterprises necessarily vary widely
from country to country. Such is to be expected when one
recognizes that the foundation for such regulation in democra-
cies is inherently political. It is not driven by the application of
abstract economic theory – unless such an application is a
reﬂection of deeper public opinion and political initiatives.
Despite some seeming similarities in the economic problems
they face, U.S. regulation – in all of its important statutory,
constitutional, accounting, and legal respects – is intrinsically
different than UK regulation. UK regulators have, simultaneously,
much greater peremptory power and much less information than
their U.S. counterparts (in legislatively directed standardized
formats) upon which to direct that power. To be sure, citing these
differences is no criticism of UK regulation – it simply reﬂects UK
political realities and choices. But U.S. regulatory bodies formed
the greater part of a century before those in the UK. They reﬂect
important elements of checks on executive power over private
enterprise that the UK simply does not have. REV complicated its
chance to achieve the attractive parts of its ultimate vision when
it did not look closely enough into these essential institutional
histories and differences.
There are highly useful parts of REV’s vision. It has long been
true that U.S. regulators by and large are practical and politically
minded people who prefer methods tested by experience rather
than general reasoning or economic theory. Inertia thrives in such a
system of regulation. Only general upheavals in markets, or the
press of public opinion, prompt legislators or regulators to address
new problems or change the structure of regulated companies or
basic services and prices. In a world of increasingly intense focus on
energy efﬁciency, electric metering and rate structures genuinely
appear outdated and incapable of efﬁciently promoting the most
modern distributed generation, grid technology, and efﬁcient and
economic customer choices. To the extent that REV targets such
problems, that part of its vision can well work to a more efﬁcient
and green power supply.
In the sections below, I take four perspectives on the problems
with REV’s discussion of basic U.S. regulation: (1) its problem in
dealing with the context of U.S. regulatory institutions; (2) its
particular focus on electricity distribution, in spite of other
regulated industries where U.S. regulation has produced efﬁcient6 Makholm, J.D., “Regulation of Natural Gas in the United States, Canada and
Europe: Prospects for a Low Carbon Fuel,” Review of Environmental Economics and
Policy, Vol. 9, No 1 (Winter 2015), pp. 107–127.and carbon-friendly advances; (3) its seeming preoccupation with
two conceptual economic issues (“information asymmetry” and
“capex bias”) that scholars of U.S. regulation effectively dealt with
long ago; and (4) its subsequent complication of the problems
associated with distributed energy, storage, and more advanced
electronic management of prices and loads that could genuinely
represent a marked advance in the regulation of the electricity
business.
It may appear to some that what drives REV is economics
rather than legal precedent, accounting, or other factors that
might be held as obstacles to a “clean, efﬁcient, transactive and
adaptable” future of electric supply.7 That is not correct.
Economic theory is not so simplistic as to assume away the
institutions that make U.S. regulation work. Neither is economic
theory ignorant of how other markets reﬂect upon the nature of
the regulatory relationships in electric markets. But economic
theory can easily be applied without context—precisely what
most detracts from REV in the way it has chosen to raise issues
such as “capital bias” and “information asymmetry” to a level of
prominence that is probably undeserved in an institutional
setting that digested their importance and invented institutions
to deal with them long ago.
2. The real US regulatory model
The REV makes the U.S. model of utility regulation sound
irretrievably outdated:
. . . the widening gulf between the competitive realities of the
modern economy and the regulated utility model of the
previous century makes the status quo unsustainable. . . . Left
unaltered, the current utility and regulatory model could lead to
uneconomic grid defection and eventually result in stranded
investments and increasing ﬁnancial challenges.8
That implication is generally incorrect. The U.S. regulated utility
model represents, at its core, an evolution of institutions to deal
with promoting orderly action where the private interests of utility
investors intersect with the public interest at large. Those
economists who have written extensively about the origin of
the institutions of U.S. regulation recognize that it was not merely a
response to market problems (economies of scale, information
asymmetry, etc.) but dealt more practically with “harmonizing
relations between parties who are otherwise in actual or potential
conﬂict . . . . [with] the purpose of promoting the continuity of
relationships by devising specialized governance structures.9
The U.S. regulatory institutions created to “harmonize the
relations” between private enterprise and the public interest
evolved over time; a product of public opinion, legislative action,
and judicial precedent. As in other spheres of democratic
governance, such institutions evolve. Indeed, New York can take
due recognition for being central to many of the key events that led
to the building of the U.S. regulatory model:
 Private capital for U.S. infrastructure as a reaction to failed public
investments. The uniquely American track toward private
investment in public infrastructure services, rather than the
public ﬁnancing evident in most of the rest of the world, came
with the failure of early 19th century canals. In particular, the
depression of 1839–1842 left New York and other states needing7 Order Adopting a Ratemaking and Utility Revenue Model Policy Framework,
May 19, 2016, p. 2.
8 Case 14-M-0101, May 19th, 2016, p. 5.
9 Williamson, O.E., The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, Free Press, New York
(1985), p. 3.
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public opinion (as expressed in state legislatures) and the
investment community looked to harness private capital for
major infrastructure and utility investments.11
 Conﬁrmation of the role of investor-owned utilities in the United
States. By 1905, the growth of private U.S. utilities compared to
public UK utilities led the National Civic Federation (a prominent
civic research group) to study which path was wise to pursue
further in America. A committee including economist John R.
Commons (who wrote America’s ﬁrst state utility law for
Wisconsin), utility holding company pioneer Samuel Insull, and
future Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis spent six months
studying dozens of publicly owned and investor-owned utilities
in the U.S. and UK. They found that different public attitudes
toward private enterprise and public administration in the U.S.
and UK meant for greater acceptance of continued private
ownership in the U.S., even if public ownership was more
dominant in the UK.12
 New legislation to deal with investor-owned utilities. The
National Civic Federal study led directly to the model for U.S.
state utility regulation. Drawing from that study, Commons
wrote the Wisconsin statute at the behest of Wisconsin Gov.
Robert LaFollette, Sr. The New York statute was developed by
Charles Evans Hughes (later a U.S. Supreme Court Justice). Both
laws were the immediate result of the 1905–1906 National Civic
Federation study, and Commons had a role in the appointment of
Milo Maltbie, a Civic Federation Committee member, to the new
Public Service Commission in New York.13
 Public transparency of private public service ﬁrms. It was in 1912
that the Supreme Court ﬁrst ruled that if a company provides
services to the public, then the public in essence owns that
company’s operational and ﬁnancial books and records. In a case
concerning transporters regulated by the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that accounting
systems for privately owned public utilities were public
matters.14
 Congress acts to deal with U.S. holding companies. The holding
company structure adopted by electric and gas utilities during
the 1920s–1930s, pioneered by Insull, enabled a number of
ﬁnancial and afﬁliate abuses.15 The collapse of Insull’s holding
company empire in 1931–32 aroused strong public opinion—not
unlike the controversy surrounding the unexpected collapse of
Enron 70 years later.16 The Public Utility Holding Company Act
was Congress’s ﬁrst response.10 The Erie Canal was critical in opening up the “Northwest Territories” of the early
nineteenth century (i.e., Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio) to East Coast markets.
Begun in 1817 and completed in 1825, the canal linked Lake Erie on the Great Lakes
to the Hudson River that ﬂowed to New York City. The Erie Canal was key to making
New York City the most important trading and ﬁnance city in the world—a position
it still holds.
11 Davis, L.E., and North, D.C., Institutional Change and American Economic Growth,
pp. 77–79,139–143. Even the state of New York had trouble raising the $7 million for
a canal that was 363 miles long, 20 feet wide, and 4 feet deep, with a rise of 630 feet
and a drop of 62 feet from the Hudson River to Lake Erie.
12 Municipal and Private Operation of Public Utilities (three volumes), National Civic
Federation, New York (1907). See: Munro, W.B., “Review: The Civic Federation
Report on Public Ownership,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1908),
pp. 161–174.
13 Read, H.J., Defending the Public: Milo R. Maltbie and Utility Regulation in New York,
Dorrance Publishing, Pittsburgh (1998).
14 Troxel, E, Economics of Public Utilities, p. 120, citing Interstate Commerce Com. V.
Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U.S. 194, 211 (1912).
15 Phillips, C.F. Jr., The Regulation of Public Utilities, Public Utilities Reports, Inc.,
Arlington, Virginia (1993), pp. 625–635.
16 Cudahy, R.D., and Henderson, W.D., “From Insull to Enron: Corporate (Re)
Regulation after the Rise and Fall of Two Energy Icons,” Energy Law Journal, Vol. 26,
No. 1 (2005), pp. 35–110. Congress acts to regulate accounting. Congress’s second re-
sponse was the Natural Gas Act of 1938—the ﬁrst legislation to
mandate the Uniform System of Accounts (although the Federal
Power Commission, an early Congressional creation, ﬁrst
prescribed what led to that accounting system in 1937).17 The
Uniform System of Accounts lies behind the “Form 1” (electrici-
ty) and “Form 2” (gas pipeline) publicly accessible and highly
transparent accounting systems that are unique in the world.
Those transparent systems were critical to setting up the ﬁnal
battle regarding how the Supreme Court would deﬁne the value
of utility property for computing allowed revenues.
 The Supreme Court deﬁnes the value of regulatory property
under the U.S. Constitution. In 1944, in taking the appeal of the
ﬁrst fully litigated rate case under the Natural Gas Act (and the
outgrowth of the Public Utility Act), the Supreme Court ruled in
Federal Power Commission et al. v. Hope Natural Gas Co.18 With the
Hope ruling, the Supreme Court held that the 5th and 14th
amendments of the U.S. Constitution required that, in setting
permissible revenues, a utility’s proﬁt (resting on invested
capital as reﬂected in accurate bookkeeping) would be measured
by potential earnings for investors based on other enterprises of
similar risk. The Hope decision secured utility companies’
investments from seizure (a “taking” of private property without
due process) if regulators set charges to award returns consistent
with investors’ opportunity cost of the equity capital invested in
regulated enterprises as recorded in those enterprises’ books.
James Bonbright (the witness for the FPC in that case) called it
rightly “one of the most important economic pronouncements in
the history of American law.19
 Congress legitimizes Commission regulation action. During the
1930s, legal scholars studied the legality of utility regulation’s
growing impact on the value of investor property. Regulators
appeared to have a degree of discretion that seemed to violate
the U.S. Constitution’s prohibition of the taking of property
without due process. Congress addressed these issues by passing
the Administrative Procedures Act of1946, which laid out
procedures to assure constitutional due process in regulatory
decision-making (including timing limits, the need to act upon
evidence, the ability of witnesses presenting that evidence to be
cross-examined, and many other aspects of the work of
regulators).20
To be sure, this is not an exhaustive list of the institutions that
make up the U.S. regulatory model to which REV claims is
outdated—just my own.21 Some of the institutions were invented
and imposed to protect investor property (like the Hope decision
and the Administrative Procedures Act). Others were invented to
give regulators the tools needed to do their job effectively (like the
Uniform System of Accounts). Thus, if the UK’s electricity
regulator’s (Ofgem’s) board members were transferred from
London to Albany, N.Y., the members would ﬁnd themselves
straightjacketed by legal procedure, overwhelmed by data and
evidence presented by adverse parties, and curiously immune from
the direct inﬂuence of the Governor. Likewise, if the NYPSC17 Federal Power Commission, Uniform System of Accounts for Public Utilities and
Licensees, Jan. 1, 1937.
18 The Hope Natural Gas Company was a Standard Oil Company gas pipeline
subsidiary that ﬁled suit against the FPC over its ﬁrst ruling under the Natural Gas
Act of 1938.
19 Bonbright, J.C., “Utility Rate Control Reconsidered in the Light of the Hope
Natural Gas Case,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 38, No. 2. (1948), p. 465.
20 Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Pub.L. 79–404, 60 Stat. 237. Former Sen.
Moynihan (Democrat – New York) discussed the historical and political origins of
the Administrative Procedures Act. See: Moynihan, D. P., Secrecy: The American
Experience, Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut (1998).
21 Longer discussions of each appear in my book The Political Economy of Pipelines.
Fig. 1. The Foundations of New York (i.e., US) and UK Regulation.
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astonished at the lack of controlling precedent, their freedom to
act, the lack of data, and the “absence of adverseness” as they were
used to back home.22
This brings me to UK utility regulation and the RIIO. Perhaps the
best way to characterize the differences between U.S. and UK
regulatory models is to look directly at the critical foundations of
each, as below (Fig. 123).
It may not do justice to represent these two regulatory
systems both as pyramids in the sense that each provides a
similar sort of foundation. The greatest difference is the history of
these two systems: it has been over 75 years since the U.S.
Congress mandated strict accounting standards, 65 since it
speciﬁed exacting administrative methods to preserve the
constitutionality of regulatory actions, 70 since the Court deﬁned
what regulated private property meant, and over 100 since the
Court ruled that the public owns the books and records of private
utilities (not the shareholders). No living economist participated
in these events.
By contrast, everything in the right-hand pyramid is somewhat
of a work in progress. Regarding appeal, it has always been possible
to appeal UK regulatory actions to the UK Competition and Markets
Authority (CMA), but, within limits, it does not seem that such
appeals limit UK regulators’ relative discretion in setting revenue
levels—particularly compared to U.S. counterparts. With regards to
accounting, Ofgem has been working on Regulatory Accounting
Guidelines for years, but being staffed more by economists that
accountants or lawyers, it has largely abandoned that effort. With
regard to administration, compared to the U.S. 1946 APA, there is
little limiting UK regulators’ discretion to render opinions
regardless of the evidence before it. Nothing exists in the UK to
mirror the Hope decision. And while the Ofgem “Commission” (the
Gas and Electricity Market Authority) was created by law, not the
Executive (i.e., the Cabinet), the Executive effectively wields
considerable inﬂuence over its regulators subject to some avenues
of appeal (that may lessen with Brexit).22 In noting the general failure of oil pipeline regulation under the Interstate
Commerce Commission, the U.S. Department of Justice once lamented the
interlocked shipper ownership on the oil pipeline system, and the resulting lack
of strong contending constituencies, labeling the problem the “absence of
adverseness.” See: In the matter of Valuation of Common Carrier Pipelines, Docket
No. RM-78-2, Statement of the Department of Justice (Donald A. Kaplan, Chief,
Energy Section, Antitrust Division), October 23, 1978, p. 9.
23 I thank my NERA UK colleagues (Graham Shuttleworth, Richard Hern, Richard
Druce, and James Grayburn) for helping with the UK pyramid and the subsequent
explanations of its relevant components in the context of the UK’s RIIO.REV borrows heavily from the UK’s RIIO without fairly
acknowledging the different institutional foundation upon which
RIIO rests. For example, REV says: “[a] more comprehensive way to
address the issue of potential capital bias is simply to eliminate the
distinction between capital and operating expenses, for rate-
making purposes . . . [with] the United Kingdom’s RIIO initiative
as the most prominent use of the [that] approach.24 It may be
simple for Ofgem to set aside the distinction between capital and
operating cost in the pursuit of “capex bias”—but it would not be
simple in the United States, where the property that utilities
devote to providing regulated public services is so embedded in
very well entrenched rules for accounting and depreciation that
have long since passed muster at the Supreme Court.
Again, this is no criticism of UK regulation.25 The UK model
arose only after Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s privatization
efforts starting in the late 1980s. Much of it still represents an
evolving effort to deal with its privatized utilities, without speciﬁc
constitutional protections of property, the legislated Uniform
System of Accounts, or legislated administrative procedures for
regulatory actions. Indeed, the key fulcrum of the U.S. regulatory
model which is referenced in every rate case – the Hope decision
and the way it safeguards regulated property independently from
actions of regulators or the executive or legislative branches of
government – does not exist in the UK in any form.26
In the next section, I reﬂect on the other major energy supply
market – the gas market – to show how U.S. regulation “of the
previous century” works splendidly alongside efﬁcient and green
gas markets.
3. Advanced applications of the US regulatory model
Against the REV’s description of an outdated and inefﬁcient
regulatory model, the gas market in the U.S. is a paradox. In 2016, the
United States has avigorous, technology-driven, and competitive gas
market that rests upon a traditional regulatory model overseen by
FERC. On the foundation of that traditional regulatory model, FERC
oversaw the restructuring of relationships in the market and the
unbundling of services. It also oversaw the joining of a highly
advanced “Coasian” market (named after economist Ronald Coase)
to the traditional regulation of pipeline costs and entry.24 Order Adopting a Ratemaking and Utility Revenue Model Policy Framework,
May 19, 2016, pp. 101–2.
25 My UK-based colleague Graham Shuttleworth delivered a comprehensive
retrospective of those methods in a presentation to the staff of the Australian
Competition and Consumer Commission in March 2016.
26 Makholm, J.D., “Utility Regulation Principles Vary Widely Country to Country,”
Natural Gas and Electricity, Vol. 32, No. 4 (December 2015).
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footprint are tremendous. The competitive nature of the gas
market and competitive pipeline access to consumers spurred a
great technological advance in unconventional gas extraction
technology that has dramatically lowered the cost of gas for U.S.
consumers. From 2009 through 2015, U.S. consumers have saved
more than half a trillion dollars on the gas that ﬂows through the
nation’s pipeline compared to what Europeans pay for their gas. At
the same time, the low cost of gas has greatly displaced coal for U.S.
power generation, as gas is now the cheaper delivered fuel. That
same “steam coal” for power generation heads to Europe, where a
largely protectionist regulatory regime has effectively kept gas
prices tied to oil equivalents and defeated the kind of high-tech
competitive entry evident in the United States.27
The U.S. market for interstate capacity that supports such a
technologically advanced gas market is an industrial manifestation
of an economic insight that contributed to Ronald Coase’s Nobel
Prize.28 “Coasian markets” have formed in pollution rights, carbon
allowances, radio bandwidth, and other commodities through the
creation and clear deﬁnition of intangible property rights
comprising bundles of speciﬁc legal entitlements.29 A deregulated
Coasian market for intangible inland gas transport rights exists and
ﬂourishes on the U.S. interstate pipeline system. That Coasian
capacity market brought with it a substantial reduction in
traditional regulatory litigation and intervention over cost-based
pipeline tariffs.
Reform in the gas part of the U.S. energy business was driven by
the traditional and quintessentially American contest between
pressure groups before FERC and the courts. Effective pressure
group action drove pipeline regulatory developments from the late
1950s onward to 2000. U.S. gas distributors, along with the
consuming states and cities of the northern parts of the country,
fueled the regulatory and legislative conﬂict from the early 1950s
until 2000, after which they generally disbanded with the
attainment of the competitive Coasian market in legal entitle-
ments and competitive markets for gas.
The U.S. gas market has digested its competitive new regime to
tremendous effect – embracing advanced technology to commer-
cialize unconventional gas; tilting the competitive electricity
generation mix away from coal; pouring investment into new
competitive pipeline links; driving the competitive gas price away
from oil prices – down to lows not seen since the 1970s. The U.S.
has accompanied this with a masterpiece of regulatory restraint:
282 federal employees in FERC’s gas division and a 2015 budget of
about $60 million – all in! – dealing with licensing and ratemaking
for three-quarters of the world’s gas pipelines. The U.S. system
reﬂects a brilliant application of the traditional U.S. regulatory
model. Each interstate pipeline mile continues to be subject to
ultra-transparent licensing and traditional cost-based regulation
of pipeline prices. But capacity rights in those pipelines trade
among shippers in unregulated “sublet” markets displaying prices
with which those 282 FERC employees play no part. Gas producers27 Makholm, J.D., “Regulation of Natural Gas in the United States, Canada and
Europe: Prospects for a Low Carbon Fuel,: Review of Environmental Economics and
Policy, Vol. 9, No 1 (Winter 2015), pp. 107–127.
28 Coase, R.H., “The Problem of Social Cost,” Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 3
(1960), pp. 1–44. In essence, the idea attributed to Coase states that given well-
deﬁned property rights, low transactions costs, perfect competition, complete
information, and the absence of other barriers to efﬁcient resource allocation,
resources will be used efﬁciently regardless of who initially owned them, resolving
all private externalities in the process.
29 See: Ellerman, A.D., Joskow, P.L., and Harrison, D. Jr., “Emissions Trading in the
US: Experience, Lessons and Considerations for Greenhouse Gases,” The Pew Center
on Global Climate Change (May 2003); Kwerel, E.R., and Rosston, G.L., “An Insider’s
View of FCC Spectrum Auctions,” Journal of Regulatory Economics, Vol. 7, No. 3, (May
2000), pp. 253–289.can reach any buyer on the interstate pipeline system simply by
acquiring capacity rights at the going price, with no bureaucracy or
regulator involved – hence the veritable explosion in technologi-
cally driven competitive innovation and the ﬁnancial capital to
support it.
The “regulated utility model of the previous century” works,
and there is no end in sight to its application. FERC did examine
different ways to regulate prices (incentive regulation or market-
based gas pipeline rates), but it rejected both in favor of traditional
regulation combined with Coasian markets for capacity.30 “Infor-
mation asymmetry” and “capex bias,” two terms that appear often
as problems in the REV documents, never came up.
Why not? The answer is that those problems were reasonably
dealt with long ago with traditional U.S. regulatory institutions.
This is not to say that “information asymmetry” and “capex bias”
do not exist as conceptual issues. But the history and context of U.S.
regulation puts those issues in a different perspective.
4. ‘Information asymmetry’ and ‘capex bias’
Economists and regulators have long understood that investor-
owned utilities have more information on their operations and
opportunities than outsiders do. They have also known that
utilities look to invested capital as their key source of earnings.31
The distinctive thing about traditional U.S. regulation is that those
“outsiders” have for decades had the tools to deal with these issues
reasonably well.
4.1. ‘You can observe a lot by watching’ (Yogi Berra)
“Information asymmetry” appears exclusively in the REV orders
as a theoretical regulatory problem without institutional back-
ground.32 For example, REV states:
The problem of asymmetry . . . drives regulators to accept a sub-
optimal approach to ratemaking that is risk-averse and provides
utilities with little incentive to seek out innovative solutions
that can increase customer value or reduce system costs.33
The information asymmetry inherent in the regulatory process
makes it difﬁcult for regulators to limit capital spending [as
opposed to spending on operating costs], because utilities have
the best information as to their needs and the alternatives that
might control spending.34
Information asymmetry is among the greatest challenges in
cost-of-service ratemaking . . . . Nobel Prize-winning econo-
mist Jean Tirole . . . emphasizes that asymmetry of informa-
tion regarding true costs, beneﬁts, and alternatives impairs the
efﬁciency of ratemaking.35
The problem with these statements is that they treat regulation
as a blank slate and ignore what U.S. regulators have done to
address the problems.3630 The Political Economy of Pipelines, pp. 75–6.
31 See: Averch, H., and Johnson, L.L., “Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory
Constraint,” The American Economic Review, Vol. LII, No. 5. (December 1962), pp.
1052–1069.
32 The phrase appears a dozen times in the May 26, 2016, Order Adopting a
Ratemaking and Utiltiy Revenue Model Policy Framework, Case 14-M-0101.
33 Case 14-M-0101, Order Adopting a Ratemaking and Utility Revenue Model
Policy Framework, May 19, 2016, p. 3.
34 Ibid, p. 29.
35 Ibid, p. 33. 2014 Nobel Prize-winning economist Jean Tirole, among other
economists, has long recognized that different types of regulatory regimes have
dealt with the problems with differing levels of success. See: Laffont, J-J., and Tirole,
J., A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, MIT Press, Cambridge MA and
London, 1994.
36 See: Crew, M. and Kleindorfer, M: http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/risk/down-
loads/archive/arch292.pdf.
40 Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (FAS) No. 33, Financial Reporting and
Changing Price, Invitation to Comment: Supplementary Disclosures about the
J.D. Makholm / The Electricity Journal 29 (2016) 48–55 53U.S. regulation long ago adopted methods to both heighten
transparency and standardize the provision of publicly available
and consistent ﬁnancial and operating information for all regulated
utilities. Also, Congress devised administrative procedures per-
mitting all parties affected by regulation (including both consum-
ers and affected industries) to have a voice in dealing with their
interests. These are elements of transparency and due process that
are unique to U.S. regulation.
4.2. ‘Capex,’ ‘totex,’ ‘fast money,’ ‘slow money’
These terms grate on the ears of those (like me) with a long
experience of dealing with the ﬁnancial accounting aspects of U.S.
regulation. They are not terms in common use among U.S.
accountants, economists, or regulators who work with or account
for the constitutionally protected value of investor capital devoted
to serving the public. Capital costs and operating costs are not
fungible and substitutable in terms of U.S. regulatory institutions.
The seeming balanced equivalence of “capex” and “opex”
combined into “totex” is borrowed UK regulatory terminology:
A more comprehensive way to address the issue of potential
capital bias is simply to eliminate the distinction between
capital and operating expenses, for ratemaking purposes. This
approach combines operating expenses (opex) with capital
expenditures (capex) into a single sum of total expenditures
(totex). Staff identiﬁed the United Kingdom’s RIIO initiative as
the most prominent use of the totex approach.37
The question of the differences in how U.S. and UK regulators deal
with the capital devoted to public utilities is a very large and
important subject, going far beyond the purpose of this short article.
Nevertheless, an illustration of what the REV does not acknowledge
is the different treatment of inﬂation by U.S. and UK regulators:
whether inﬂation is paid in cash, year by year, to reﬂect inﬂation in
the allowed nominal return or, instead, entered as an upward book
entry adjustment to the rate base to collect the current opportunity
cost of inﬂation in the future. U.S. regulation uses historic cost
accounting that treats the rate base and return components of the
cost of service in nominal terms. UK regulation uses “current” cost
accounting that indexes the rate base for inﬂation.
The UK turned to current cost accounting for regulation with the
rapid privatization of British Gasin 1986,where, owing tothe press of
time, the government used accounting rules designed for valuing
investments in public enterprises. Led by I. C. R. Byatt – then Deputy
Chief Economic Advisor, HM Treasury – the “Byatt Report” is well
known in the UK. The report focused on nationalized industries,
where the capital markets were not directly involved in ﬁnancing.38
That report was subsequently adopted in Australia after the
application of “optimal deprival value” tariff base accounting (a
Byatt Report concept) in New Zealand.39 In all three countries,
“current” cost accounting is the standard for regulating the rate base.
Such is not the case for U.S. regulators, despite a noteworthy
attempt to study the issue of whether historical or “current” costs
better reﬂect economic conditions. Along with many other
countries in the developed world, the U.S. experienced unexpected
inﬂation in the 1970s. Accordingly, the Federal Accounting
Standards Board began a ﬁve-year experiment in 1979 to require37 Case 14-M-0101, Order Adopting a Ratemaking and Utility Revenue Model
Policy Framework, May 19, 2016, pp. 101–2.
38 See: Accounting for Economic Costs and Changing Prices,A Report to HM Treasury
by an Advisory Group, Her Majesty’s Stationery Ofﬁce, London (1986) (the “Byatt
Report”), Vol. 1, p. 5. “ . . . accounting for changing prices is especially important
in nationalised industries. . . . Nationalised industries . . . differ from most of
the private sector . . . [in that among other things] there is no competitive market
in the capital of the industries.” (emphasis in original).
39 The Political Economy of Pipelines, p. 161.large companies to disclose supplemental price-adjusted informa-
tion data (in addition to historical cost data) about Inventories and
Property, Plant, and Equipment. In 1983 FASB requested comments
on the utility of that potential standard for inﬂation accounting.40
Responders included institutional investors, market analysts,
rating agencies, retailers, suppliers, manufacturers, and others.
U.S. industry hated the idea. The approximately 400 comments
received were highly critical of the cost and usefulness of inﬂation-
adjusted ﬁnancial statements.41 A large majority of respondents
commented that the data provided in the experiment: (1) were too
simplistic to represent actual ongoing cost or entry cost; (2) were
not reﬂective of price changes of speciﬁc assets; (3) could not
incorporate changes in technology and preferences; (4) were not a
useful indicator of future spending or cash requirements; and (5)
were ignored by managers, market analysts, industry experts, and
shareholders. As a result of the experiment, FASB subsequently
eliminated the price change reporting requirement.
The U.S. treatment of capital for all purposes – regulatory,
ﬁnancial, tax – is what would be expected in a country with the
largest capital markets and where the property represented by that
capital is protected under the 5th and 14th Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution. There is no possibility that in such an environment U.
S. regulators could treat the barrier between capital and operating
costs as fungibly as Ofgem appears to do in the application of
“totex” in its RIIO. Yet, the NYPSC continues to discuss “totex” as a
“comprehensive way to address the issue so potential capital bias”
in its May 19, 2016, order.42
4.3. Incentive regulation generally
There is a great deal of discussion about incentive regulation in
the REV documents, including its application in the UK. Indeed, the
UK popularized a method of tariff regulation in water, electricity,
gas, and telecommunications called “RPI-X” or “price cap”
regulation there in 1984.43 Following its popularity in the UK,
price cap regulation was adopted in the United States for ATT in
1989 and for other U.S. gas and electricity companies subsequently.
The application of somewhat similar performance-based
regulation (PBR) pricing formulas, however, masks the same
underlying institutional differences upon which price regulation
was based in the UK. Neither the UK nor the other jurisdictions that
began regulation with the UK-inspired privatization efforts have
the constitutional, accounting, and administrative institutions that
deﬁne U.S. regulation. Probably the most useful way to signal that
the institutions upon which basic regulation is based are quite
different in the United States than abroad concerns the source of
the X-factor. In practice in the UK (prior to RIIO) the X-factor does
not come from a study of productivity growth but rather is a
way to synchronize current prices (or revenues) with long-term
economic forecasts (up to ﬁve years, depending on the formula
period) of capital and operating costs. Such forecasts of long-term
costs are contrary to the “known and measurable” standardsEffects of Changing Prices, December 1983.
41 IN 2014, I provided a summary of these industry comments on FAS No. 33 as a
part of my review for of the current-cost accounting standards currently in use in
Australia for ATCO Gas Australian Pty Ltd (Makholm, J.D., Report on the subject of cost
accounting for gas pipelines).
42 Order Adopting a Ratemaking and Utility Revenue Model Policy Framework,
May 19, 2016, p. 101.
43 Armstrong, M., Cowan, S., and Vickers, J., Regulatory Reform: Economic Analysis
and British Experience, The MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts (1994), page 165.
The economic literature uses various synonymous terms for price cap regulation.
Other terms include CPI-X regulation, RPI-X regulation, performance-based
ratemaking (PBR).
54 J.D. Makholm / The Electricity Journal 29 (2016) 48–55for U.S. utility regulation.44 Ofgem, in its 2009 price review, backed
out the X-factor as the value that would permit current prices to
trend toward the forecast costs for electricity distributors ending in
2015.45 That particular method of using the productivity factor to
square differences between two different forecasts of costs (the
utility’s and the regulator’s) follows forecasts of the type that are
contrary to the “known and measurable” standard for U.S.
regulators. That key difference signals that the practices of
incentive regulation UK methods up to the adoption of RIIO have
been distinctly different than those used by its U.S. counterparts.
All of the foregoing discussion of U.S. regulation and its legal,
regulatory, accounting, and constitutional foundations should not
serve to distract from what might be called the real motivation of
REV. I look brieﬂy at some of these problems next.
5. Microgrids, distributed generation, multi-sided markets and
third parties
Unquestionably, there is urgency in applying efﬁcient and green
initiatives to the U.S. electricity grid.46 And an initiative like REV
may well represent timely pressure to overcome longstanding
inertia regarding such initiatives. Indeed, New York was important
in institutionalizing “marginal-cost pricing” in U.S. regulation.
Marginal-cost pricing had been known to economists since the
1930s.47 Other countries, particularly France and the UK, had
instituted marginal cost pricing for their state-owned utilities
beginning in the mid-1950s.48 But only public opinion could drive
U.S. regulators to study the problem.49 Public opinion came when
inﬂation, OPEC-driven oil prices, and the seeming exhaustion of
scale economies in the electric utility industry sent the business
into turmoil. My late colleague, Prof. Alfred Kahn, was ready, as
Chairman of the New York Public Service Commission and having
just written his classic text on the subject.50 Led by Wisconsin and
New York, regulators and state legislators began to target marginal
cost as the basis for more efﬁcient utility ratemaking.5144 “An agency is justiﬁably skeptical of budget cost estimates as a basis for
ratemaking. It will rely on test period results to adjustment for known or reasonably
expected changes.” – Goodman, Leonard Saul. The Process of Ratemaking. Volume I,
Public Utilities Reports, Inc. Vienna, VA. 1998, p. 281. For a discussion of the “known
and measurable” U.S. regulatory standard, see also: McDermott, K., Cost of Service
Regulation in the Investor-owned Electric Utility Industry: A History of Adaptation,
Edison Electric Institute, Washington, D.C., June 2012.
45 Ofgem (2009) on the electricity distribution price control for April 2010 to
March 2015 (Distribution Price Control Review 5). Reference 149/09, Dec. 7, 2009.
See: http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Pages/MoreInformation.aspx?docid=371&refer=-
Networks/ElecDist/PriceCntrls/DPCR5.
46 See The Future of the Electric Grid: An Interdisciplinary MIT Study, MIT, 2011.
47 Hotelling, H, “The General Welfare in Relation to Problems of Taxation and of
Railway and Utility Rates,” Econometrica, 6 (1938), pp. 242–269; Bonbright, J.C.,
“Major Controversies as to the Criteria of Reasonable Public Utility Rates,” American
Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 30, No. 5 (1941). p. 385.
48 See Phillips, The Regulation of Public Utilities, p. 442 and pp. 470–471 (note 20).
49 A prominent economist of the 1930s and 1940s describing it in 1947 said:
“Trusting to their common sense, regulators are certain to call the marginal-cost
proposal an unrealistic plan of control. To the public ofﬁcials it is a strange idea,
based on peculiar reasoning and expressed in an unfamiliar language. Since these
men are rarely interested in what they consider odd thinking, nothing short of a
general upheaval in utility regulation can drive them to study the idea.” Troxel, E.,
Economics of Public Utilities, Rinehart & Company, New York, 1947, p. 463.
50 Kahn, A.E., The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions (Two
Volumes), John Wiley & Sons, New York (1971).
51 In 1974, the Wisconsin Public Service Commission, under Chairman Richard
Cudahy, opened a general investigation into the application of marginal cost pricing
for the electric utilities in that state in a case involving Madison Gas and Electric
Company (see: Cudahy, R.D., “Rate Redesign Today: The Aftermath of Madison Gas,”
Public Utilities Fortnightly, May 20, 1976, pp. 15–19). This was one year before New
York opened a similar marginal cost pricing investigation, driven by Chairman Kahn.
Fred Kahn always lamented to his colleagues that Chairman Cudahy beat him to the
punch.Similarly, public opinion would appear to be calling for
innovative advancements for the U.S. electric distribution grid:
 Data sharing: The Joint Utilities in New York think that access to
customer energy consumption data has good potential to
empower consumers and third-party providers.52
 Distributed generation. The attraction to the idea of moving from
a highly industrialized, carbon-heavy power grid to one more
decentralized, self-sufﬁcient, and green is inescapable. But
splicing distributed PV programs onto the grids that modern
electricity consumers have inherited face various problems. A
grid ties consumers together to share both costs and beneﬁts.
Energy demand remains inconveniently mismatched with when
the sun shines. Distributed batteries would help, but they dont
yet exist. Consumer energy metering is primitive. “Net metering”
is a recognized problem that overcompensates for distributed
resources. Consumers may not be well informed about the long-
term payoff of small-scale PV installations.53
 Advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) and net metering. The
Joint Utilities state that, “AMI has known technical capabilities
that can support grid modernization on both the customer and
grid side of the meter.54
 Microgrids.There is much to be said for microgrids: more reliable
system backup; easing congestion; better integration of wind and
solar resources; managing waste heat; reliability “islands”for
customers that need it; demand response resources.55
Whether any of these attributes of microgrids permit a
permanent cutting of the link to surrounding distribution
grids is doubtful. But new methods of charging for regulated
grid connections and usages would greatly aid economic
efﬁciency.
 Multi-sided platform markets. Dealing with the existing
regulated grid as a “platform” in hosting new information and
communication technologies, smart metering, and electric
vehicles sources of fee-based balancing and charge management
among them.56
With such advances on the horizon, the technology and pricing
of existing natural monopoly electricity grids are indeed a
“century-old” problem. Reliable metering of electricity began in
1894 with the invention of a commercially available watt-hour
meter. But the pricing practices of most electricity companies are
still restricted to 19th century volumetric pricing (for much of the
residential and commercial groups)—often-enough reﬂecting
broad averages of costs and failing to have the capability to52 Reply Comments of the Joint Utilities on the October 15, 2015 Staff Proposal, January
6, 2016, p. 10.
53 Makholm, J.D., “Distributed Energy and Low Carbon vs. Consumers, Regulators
and Tin Men,” Natural Gas and Electricity, Vol. 33, No 3 (July 2016).
54 Reply Comments of the Joint Utilities on the October 15, 2015 Staff Proposal, January
6, 2016, p. 25.
55 Haresh Kamath, Tom Key, “Microgrids: A Primer,” Electric Power Research
Institute, September 6, 2013, http://nyssmartgrid.com/wp-content/uploads/Micro-
grid_Primer_v18-09-06-2013.pdf.; Sarah C. Bronin, “Curbing Energy Sprawl with
Microgrids,” Connecticut Law Review, Volume 43, Number 2, December 2010, http://
uconn.lawreviewnetwork.com/ﬁles/documents/SaraC.Bronin43Conn.L.Rev.547.
pdf.; Christopher VIllareal, David Erickson, Marzia Zafar, “Microgrids: A Regulatory
Perspective,” California Public Utilities Commission, Policy & Planning Division,
April 14, 2014; Michael T. Burr, “Minnesota Microgrids: Barriers, Opportunities, and
Pathways Toward Energy Assurance,” Prepared by Microgrid Institute for the
Minnesota Department of Commerce, September 30, 2013, http://mn.gov/
commerce-stat/pdfs/microgrid.pdf.; Ward Bower, “The Advanced Microgrid:
Integration and Interoperability,” Sandia National Laboratories, March 2014,
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/ﬁles/2014/12/f19/AdvancedMicrogrid_Integration-
Interoperability_March2014.pdf
56 Weiller, C.M., and Pollitt, M.G., “Platform Markets and Energy Services,”
University of Cambridge EPRG Working Paper 1334, December 2013.
J.D. Makholm / The Electricity Journal 29 (2016) 48–55 55transmit the most efﬁcient signals and commands to distributed
generating and storage resources. There are great advances to be
made in these directions.
With current technology, however, the grid is the grid, and the
kind of electric service reliability that spread to electricity users
remains one of the great advances of the industrial age. There are
very few distributed generation customers or microgrids that
would permanently break the link to the local distribution
networks maintained by the traditional U.S. utilities.
The plan outlined for the electricity distributors in the NYPSC’s
May 19, 2016, order deals with setting up the evidentiary
examination of these problems, along with various incentive
and customer engagement initiatives, in the utilities’ next rate
proceedings. It is evident in the replies from the electric utilities in
New York that they embrace a deliberative process to study the
“evolutionary and incremental” nature of the market-based and
efﬁcient changes in the way distribution grids operate.57 Central to
these advances is the recognition that more efﬁcient methods of
recovering ﬁxed distribution costs (like “decoupling” and ﬁxed/
demand charges) is economically efﬁcient.58 It is also apparent
that the utilities have little regard for upsetting the traditional U.S.
regulatory model in favor of UK methods—particularly the use of
“outcomes” rather than costs as the basis of regulated revenues.59
The utilities also usefully oppose “benchmarking” basic elements
of traditional distribution revenue requirements,60 and the
proposition that “capital bias” is a signiﬁcant regulatory problem
that traditionally effective Commission oversight of capital
expenditure programs does not already effectively deal with
(including rate cases reviews, period reporting, regular meeting
with the NYPSC staff, and the application of the judicial prudence
standard).61
In all of these respects, the extensive comments from the
utilities generally perform the function of reminding staff and
others that there is a substantial U.S. regulatory architecture that
can be harnessed to gather the information, reform the pricing, and
engage customers in new efﬁciencies in their interactions with the
grid.
6. Conclusion
When contrasting traditional U.S. regulation with either
abstract regulatory models or those in other countries (like RIIO
in the UK), the most important thing to understand is the tightly
woven institutional rule book by which U.S. regulators and57 Initial Comments of the Joint Utilities on the October 15, 2015 Staff Proposal:
Distribution System Implementation Plan Guidance, Dec. 7, 2015, p. 2.
58 Comments of the Joint Utilities on Track 2 in Response to Questions Posed in the May
1, 2014 Administrative Ruling, p. 35.
59 Comments of the Joint Utilities on Track 2 in Response to Questions Posed in the May
1, 2014 Administrative Ruling, pp. 4–5.
60 Initial Comments of the Joint Utilities on the Jul 28, 2015 Staff White Paper on
Ratemaking and Utility Business Models, October 26, 2015, p. 31.
61 Initial Comments of the Joint Utilities on the Jul 28, 2015 Staff White Paper on
Ratemaking and Utility Business Models, October 26, 2015, p. 6.regulated ﬁrms live. The U.S. institutional regulatory rule book
was decades in the making, apolitical, reﬂective of deep legal and
economic scholarship and mostly ﬁnished so long ago that no
living regulator, jurist, or economist was involved in the debates.
In contrast, there is no institutional rulebook for abstract
regulatory models. And the rules by which Ofgem and UK ﬁrms
live, for example, are relatively new works in progress. As such,
the differences in the U.S. and UK institutional rulebooks and the
degrees of freedom for regulators who live by them are really
quite striking. To tread lightly over those deeper rules (or to
overlook the institutions entirely) and seize upon wholly new
features from other regulatory experiences – like “totex” – is
inevitably unhelpful in trying to chart the types of changes in
electricity distribution prices that will drive new efﬁciencies and
new services.
This is where REV has had difﬁculties and why its headline-
grabbing rollout in 2014 of a “new regulatory model for the 21st
century” has yielded to a more traditional path for pursuing more
efﬁcient electricity distribution services in 2016. The initial REV
rollout did not address the basic incompatibility of UK regulatory
methods (including RIIO) with the reliable institutions that have
long governed the relationship between a U.S. public (desirous of
useful and efﬁcient utility services) and the investor-owned
utilities that serve them (that need a market-based return). REV
raised conceptual economic problems (like information asymme-
try and capital bias) that U.S. regulators had long ago recognized
and tackled effectively enough to prevent them from being barriers
to useful industry reform and the provision of efﬁcient regulated
services.
But this is not to be too critical of REV. It is highly useful for New
York to make a major, newsworthy push to harness new
information technology and markets as a means to inject new
load-leveling efﬁciencies and green resources into traditional
power markets. But, all things considered, traditional U.S.
regulation – ironically much of which came originally from New
York – is still the means to make those advances happen.
Dr. Jeff D. Makholm is a Senior Vice President at National Economic Research
Associates (NERA). His work involves many aspects of regulating infrastructure
industries. He has testiﬁed hundreds of times for electric and gas utilities in many
jurisdictions in the U.S. and around the world, including on dozens of occasions in
New York on many subjects. He did his Ph.D. in Economics at the University of
Wisconsin-Madison. His latest book, The Political Economy of Pipelines: A Century of
Comparative Institutional Development, was published by the University of Chicago
Press in 2012.
